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INTRODUCTION 
 
Drought is one of the biggest and devastating events that 
mankind has witnessed throughout the world.  The 
determination of the drought onset or end, as well as its 
severity, is difficult.  It is a gradual phenomenon, its impact 
can, nevertheless, be devastating.  The drought’s impacts are 
dependent not only on the duration, intensity, and 
geographical extent, but also on the demands by human 
activities, flexibility of the region's water storage and supply, 
and the institutions of the delivery system.  They evolve over 
time and are influenced by the interactions between supply 
and demand.  Drought events and adaptation throughout the 
world have been documented in Yevjevich et al. (1983), 
Wilhite et al. (1987), and Wilhite (1993). 
 
A comparative study of drought policies (Wilhite, 1986) 
suggests that governments often respond to drought through 
crisis management rather than preplanned programs.  A 
National Research Council study argues that public agencies 
respond to water shortage, mainly by adjusting water supply.  
Easterling and Riebsame (1987) assess drought impacts and 
adjustments in agriculture and water resource systems.  They 
emphasize dynamic adjustments to reduced water availability, 
but have very little behavior analysis explicitly understanding 
the role of incentives and economic consideration affecting 
water use.   
 
Documentation on droughts in California includes data on 
water inventories and allocation, a summary of policies, 
rationing of water by urban communities, and changes in state 
water allocation to urban and agricultural users (DWR, 1977; 
DWR, 1991).  These reports also provide the impacts on 
ground water quantity and quality and economic consequences 
on agriculture and the urban areas.  This paper is concerned 
with the 1987-1991 drought in California and its impact on the 
agricultural sector.  California is an example of a state that 
relies heavily on water harvesting projects because it is very 
sensitive to rainfall and drought conditions.  California is 
basically a desert state that invented itself by water.  A 
drought that long and significant has not been observed and 
documented before.  More detailed presentations of the results 
of the paper appear in Zilberman et al., 1998). 
 
This paper demonstrates that responses to the recent 
California drought are consistent with the prediction of 
economic theory.  It also shows that a distinct event such as a 
drought leads to major changes in institutions and technology.  
The prevalence of traditional irrigation technologies, large 
proportions of acreage allocated to water-intensive crops, and 
rarity of water marketing in California might have contributed 
to skepticism about the capacity of financial incentives and 
scarcities to induce changes in water-use patterns and 
institutions in the state.  Evidence of the behavior of various 
decisionmakers at farm, water district, and state project levels 
during the drought are presented here to document the 
responsiveness of California water users and institutions to 
water scarcities.  The paper interprets data from several 
sources, including findings of two surveys, without formal 
modeling. The results speak for themselves, are accessible to 
noneconomists, and are unadulterated by the statistical 
assumptions necessary for econometric estimations.   
 
The results of this paper confirm the importance of water 
reservoirs in stabilizing surface water supplies.  Because of 
these reservoirs, farmers were not affected noticeably during 
the first three years of the 1987-1991 California droughts.  
Only during the last two years of the drought water supply to 
junior rights owners was reduced markedly, and the responses 
were increased pumping of ground water, adoption of water 
conservation technologies, and fallowing of land.  The last year 
of the drought also witnessed an important institutional 
change, namely, introduction of water trading.  
 
While the results of the paper confirm the importance of 
economic incentives and forces in response to changes, it also 
suggests a weakness in our economic education and analysis.  
Differential calculus is used to derive many results in 
economics.  Textbooks such as Teitenberg mostly educate the 
students to think in terms of continuous response of the 
system to small changes.  In many cases the system is rigid 
and small changes in prices and other parameters may not 
induce significantly observed changes in behavior.  On the 
other hand, massive changes such as the ones changed by the 
drought resulted in substantial changes and behavior that are 
consistent with the prediction of economic theory.  That 
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suggests that economists should develop analytical tools and 
emphasize analysis that deals with extreme events.  
 
BACKGROUND 
 
California is the leading agricultural state in the United States, 
but its larger agricultural counties are in arid zones.  
Agriculture accounted for 80 percent of the water consumed in 
California in normal years in the 1980s (27 MAF (million acre 
foot) out of 34.5 MAF, CDWR, 1991).  The physical system 
of mining, storage, and transportation has not changed much 
since the 1960s when the two major projects, the State Water 
Project (SWP) and the Central Valley Project (CVP), were 
added to existing surface water projects in the state.  The 
California water system has significant water storage capacity 
that allows it to adjust to short-term shortages, but the 
drought of 1987-1991 tested the system.  In the years, 1987-
1991, statewide runoff was 48 percent, 48 percent, 70 percent, 
48 percent, and 43 percent of normal runoff, respectively; and 
by summer, 1991, the CVP major reservoirs held less than 50 
percent of their storage capacity of 25 MAF.  This severe 
drought led to the changes that will be reported below.   
 
The analysis in this paper relies on results from a variety of 
studies, but most of the results were drawn from two surveys 
conducted in the summer of 1991.  Questionnaires were 
distributed to all California water districts and irrigation 
equipment dealers.  Responses at various degrees of details 
were received from 135 water districts (70 percent of the 
districts) covering 85 percent of the irrigated land in California 
and 60 percent of the surface water used for irrigation. The 
dealer survey yielded 29 responses out of 45 contacts.  Both 
surveys included responses to questions related to the period 
1987-91. A more detailed description of the survey tools can 
be found in Zilberman et al. (1992). 
 
Decisionmakers in an agricultural water system include 
managers of surface water reservoirs who decide about water 
releases at various periods; water district managers who set the 
prices and sell water to farmers; farmers, who use the water; 
and finally, water agencies that establish water allocation rules.  
We will analyze the response of each of these agents to the 
five-year drought in the following sections. 
 
WATER SUPPLY DECISIONS 
 
About two-thirds of the surface water used in California is 
allocated according to the Prior Appropriation Doctrine.  The 
state and federal water projects account for one-third of the 
surface water, and they have junior rights relative to other 
surface water users. Water reservoirs managers control 
allocation of large inventories of surface water, and their 
choices should be consistent with inventory management 
under uncertainty since precipitation varies from year to year.  
Principles of inventory management suggest that annual water 
releases should depend on the stock of water in the reservoir 
rather than the actual annual precipitation.  Thus, in the case 
of a drought, which lasts several years, deliveries of water 
from a reservoir will decline as the drought progresses.   
 
Figure 1 shows that water stocks declined during the first few 
years of the California drought.  Water stock declined by about 
50 percent at the end of the second year of the drought to 
around 15 million AF.  Table 1 shows that, even though the 
drought started in 1987, significant reductions in deliveries to 
water districts occurred only in the fourth year of the drought, 
1990, and even larger reductions occurred in 1991.  The 
reduction affected mostly contractors of the federal and state 
water projects who have relatively junior water rights 
compared to other surface water users.   
 
We will use a generic term, water district, to refer to the 
different types of organizations that buy and sell water.  It is 
reasonable to assume that they do not pursue profits but 
rather provide a service and aim to cover their costs.  It is also 
reasonable to assume that they have relatively high fixed costs.  
Thus, as water districts receive less supply during a drought, 
they may increase user fees and water prices.  Water districts 
may also replace some of the lost surface water supply by 
pumping ground water and by reducing conveyance losses 
through lining canals. 
 
The results of the water district survey show that, indeed, 
during the drought, about 50 percent of the responding 
districts changed water pricing, with a higher percentage in 
southern regions, where there was greater scarcity.  
Additionally, 11 percent of the responding districts lined their 
canals and 12 percent installed pressurized pipelines after 
1987.  Districts in the San Joaquin and Fresno counties in the 
Central Valley faced particularly severe cutbacks in water 
availability.  As a result, the largest number of water districts 
in these regions changed their water allocation rules, 69 percent 
of the districts in San Joaquin and 57 percent in Fresno, 
against the statewide average of 53 percent.  The drought also 
led the districts to offer assistance to growers for irrigation 
scheduling (45 percent) and subsidized loan programs for 
changing their irrigation methods (39 percent).   
 
FARMERS WATER CHOICES  
 
Economic considerations suggest that, ceteris paribus, 
reduction in water supply and increased water prices will lead 
farmers to increase their reliance on ground water, adopt 
water-conserving technology, reduce water use per acre, move 
away from water-intensive crops, and fallow land (Dinar & 
Zilberman, 1991).  The intensity of these responses is likely 
to increase as the drought progresses and water supplies 
decline.  
 
The observed behavior is consistent with the above 
predictions.  Figure 1 shows a continuous increase in the 
number of wells throughout the drought and an inverse 
correlation between water stocks in reservoirs and number of 
wells drilled.  Values in Table 1 demonstrate the increase in 
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ground water pumped in the central and southern San Joaquin 
regions, during the later years of the drought when surface 
water deliveries declined.  The water district surveys show 
that both districts and farmers contributed to this increase. 
The irrigation dealer survey shows a 25 percent annual 
increase in the sale of pumps during the drought.   
 
A historical perspective is useful for assessing the changes in 
irrigation practices that occurred during the drought.  
According to Casterline, Dinar, and Zilberman (1989) sprinkler 
irrigation was introduced in California during the late 1940s 
and low volume irrigation (LVI) systems, including drip and 
micro sprinkler were introduced in 1970.  The diffusion of 
these technologies in the pre-drought period, 1982-1986, was 
rather slow and in 1985 sprinkler irrigation was used on 25 
percent of irrigated land in California. These technologies were 
adopted mostly on locations with sandy soils, uneven 
topography, relatively expensive water, and, in the case of 
LVI, for tree crops.  
 
As Figure 2 demonstrates, there was a significant increase in 
the use of LVI during the drought. Between 1987 to 1991, LVI 
replaced sprinkler irrigation for different categories of tree 
fruits and increased its land share to .6 in citrus, .4 in fruits and 
nuts, and .3 in grapes.  LVI was also introduced in major 
vegetable crops, such as tomatoes for processing, and lettuce.  
Sprinkler irrigation significantly replaced furrow in other 
vegetable crops and in cotton (the most important field crop in 
California). Thus, the drought intensified the adoption of 
irrigation technologies in crops that used them before and led 
to their adoption on crops normally grown with traditional 
irrigation methods.  
 
This response supports the results of models analyzing 
investment decisions under uncertainty, where the benefits of 
irreversible investments are subject to random shocks 
(McDonald & Siegel, 1986) and firms have the option of 
delaying investments. Firms will invest only when the net 
benefits of investment exceed a positive critical value.  This 
study confirms our expectation that random events such as a 
drought are likely to drive the net benefits of investments in 
irrigation technologies above the critical level and lead firms to 
undertake investments they would not have otherwise.    
 
In the Westland water district (which suffered the largest 
water supply reductions) farmers who continued with furrow 
irrigation in that district reduced their per acre water use by 
more than ten percent without significant yield changes.  The 
drought encouraged farmers to seek the advice of irrigation 
consultants or to use computer software for their irrigation 
scheduling. There was a dramatic increase in the use of the 
services of the California Irrigation Management Information 
System (CIMIS).  From 1986 to 1991 the number of its users 
increased from 500 to 2000 (CDWR, 1993). 
 
By 1991 surface water inventories were not sufficient to 
protect the farmers from the reduced precipitation, and ground 
water and conservation were not sufficient to offset reduced 
surface water supplies. Table 1 suggests that the drought led 
to an increase of more than 50 percent in the volume of acres 
fallowed in our sample. 
 
Table 1 provides a quantitative assessment of the importance 
of various components in adjusting to the shortfall of water 
supplies in the last two years of the drought from the 1987-
1989 levels. In 1991 the project contractors in our sample 
received 1.638 MAF less than the average deliveries in 1987-
1989.  About 30 percent of this shortfall was covered by 
increased ground water pumping (ground water pumping is 
undocumented so our analysis probably underestimates the 
amount of pumping). About five percent was covered by 
increased supply of nonproject water.  Assuming that each 
acre foot of fallowed land released 3.5 AF of water, fallowing 
accounted for about another 30 percent of the shortfall. Thus, 
all other adjustment methods (new irrigation technologies, crop 
switching, conservation) accounted for the remaining 36.3 
percent of the adjustments in 1991.  These simple calculations 
suggest that when there were substantial reductions in project 
water supply, conservation, fallowing, and increased ground 
water pumping each accounted for 1/3 of the short-term 
adjustments. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 
 
Water has been allocated in California according to the prior 
appropriation system, which is a queuing system that 
discouraged trade and did not provide much incentive for 
conservation.  The literature of the political economy of 
resources (Rausser & Zusman) indicates that beneficiaries 
from the status quo will stall attempts to introduce welfare-
improving institutions, but these changes will occur at crisis 
situations when efficiency benefits from reform are more 
significant and apparent. Thus, as the drought progresses, 
political economic argumentation suggests growing pressure 
for institutional changes, such as the introduction of water 
trading and marginal cost pricing of water.  
 
The establishment of the California Drought Water Bank is a 
major institutional breakthrough, with the state approving and 
administering water trading.  In 1991, it purchased 825,000 AF 
of water and sold 435,000 AF of water.  The purchase price 
was $125 per AF, and the selling price was $175 per AF at the 
Delta.  To supply this water, 166,000 acres of agricultural land 
were fallowed.  Howitt et al., (1992) show that the water bank 
provided substantial overall economic welfare gain to the state 
and Dixon et al. show that the third-party effects of the water 
bank were modest.  Another example of institutional change is 
the Central Valley Improvement Act of 1992 (also known as 
the Bradley-Miller Bill), which legislated the reallocation of 
800,000 AF of water annually from the Central Valley Project 
for environmental purposes. It also allows the Bureau of 
Reclamation contracts to sell their water under certain 
conditions.   
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Seven water districts introduced tiered pricing to provide 
farmers with incentives to conserve water.  Tiered water 
pricing is essentially inverse block pricing in which an initial 
volume of water, based on some historical level of use, is sold 
at a given price; and water purchased above and beyond the 
historical level is sold at a significantly higher price.  Other 
districts introduced buy-back programs.  Under these 
programs, farmers are paid a certain amount not to consume all 
of their entitled water.  
 
These examples illustrate that the drought led decisionmakers 
at all levels to introduce mechanisms that rely on market forces 
and financial incentives to enhance conservation of water. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper shows the capability of economics to explain some 
of the behavioral outcomes that are associated with the recent 
California drought. In particular, (1) prices and scarcities affect 
water choices. As the drought becomes more severe, farmers 
increasingly adopt water conservation technologies, fallow 
land with relatively low-value crops, and increase ground 
water pumping.  (2) There are gains from storage.  The water 
reservoir system in California enabled its agriculture to survive 
three years of drought with minimal impact.  With storage, the 
severity of the drought is not dependent on water flow but on 
water stocks.  Of course, more detailed study is needed to 
quantify these results. 
 
The results suggest that neoclassical microeconomic models 
were able to detect correctly the direction of change that will 
occur as water prices and scarcity increase.  But in the case of 
both water technologies and institutions, we have not observed 
much adjustment in response to continuous minor changes in 
prices and scarcity conditions but, rather, a substantial change 
in response to a drastic event.  So much of our static modeling 
is better in predicting direction of change than it’s timing.   
 
For years, economists recommended a transition toward water 
markets and were frustrated by the lack of change in the 
system.  However, the height of the drought led to the 
introduction of officially approved water trading in California 
(though only for one year), which is the first step toward 
introduction of markets.  We are convinced that the economic 
work on California water provided the foundation for the 
introduction of markets even though it could not predict its 
timing.  Thus, the availability of a beneficial new technology or 
institutional design is not sufficient to assure their adoption.  
The paper suggests that extreme events trigger technological 
and institutional changes.   
 
There are other examples where the timing of technological 
change was affected by large random shocks.  The design for 
the tomato harvester was available 30 years before it was 
commercially adopted after the Bracero program was canceled 
in 1965.  The massive introduction of center pivot irrigation in 
the plains was associated with the boom in agricultural 
commodity prices in the early 1970s, where prices reached a 
new high.  Many of the most important institutional changes 
affecting U. S. agriculture have been the results of extreme 
events, such as the depression and the dust bowls of the 
1930s.  We should emphasize the development of modeling 
frameworks that are more capable of predicting the timing of 
major changes, and more attention should be given to study the 
impact of extreme events on institutional and technological 
changes. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
DWR (Department of Water Resources).  (1992).  
California Water Supply Outlook.  Compiled by 
Department of Water Resources, State of California, 
Division of Flood Management. 
 
Casterline, Gary, Ariel Dinar, & David Zilberman.  (1989).  
“The Adoption of Modern Irrigation Technologies in 
the United States.”  In Free Trade and Agricultural 
Diversification:  Canada and the United States, ed. 
Andrew Schmitz.  Boulder and London:  Westview 
Press. 
 
Dinar, Ariel, & David Zilberman. (1991).  “Effects of 
Input Quality and Environmental Conditions on 
Selection of Irrigation Technologies.”  In The 
Economics and Management of Water and Drainage 
in Agriculture, ed. Ariel Dinar & David Zilberman.  
Boston:  Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Dixon, Lloyd S., Nancy Y. Moore & Susan W. Schechter.  
(1993).  California’s 1991 Drought Water Bank:  
Economic Impacts in the Selling Regions. RAND, 
Santa Monica, California. 
 
Easterling, William E., & William E. Riebsame.  (1987).  
“Assessing Drought Impacts and Adjustments in 
Agriculture and Water Resource Systems.”  In 
Planning for Drought, ed. Donald A. Wilhite and 
William E. Easterling, with Deborah A. Wood.  
Boulder, Colorado:  Westview Press. 
 
Howitt, Richard, Nancy Moore & Rodney T. Smith.  
(1992).  A Retrospective on California’s 1991 
Emergency Drought Water Bank. California 
Department of Water Resources.  
 
McDonald, Robert, & Daniel Siegel.  (1986).  “The Value 
of Waiting to Invest.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 101:707-28. 
 
National Research Council.  (1986).  Drought 
Management and Its Impact on Public Water 
Systems.  Report on a Colloquium Sponsored by the 
Water Science and Technology Board, National 
Academy Press, Washington, D. C. 
  21
Rausser, Gordon C., & Pinhas Zusman.  (1992).  
“Organizational Failure and the Political Economy of 
Water Resources Management.”  In The Economics 
and Management of Water and Drainage in 
Agriculture, ed. Ariel Dinar and David Zilberman.  
Boston:  Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Tietenberg, Tom.  (2000).  Environmental and Natural 
Resource Economics, fifth edition.  Reading, 
Massachusetts:  Addison-Wesley Longman, Inc. 
 
Wilhite, Donald A.  (1986).  “Drought Policy in the U. S. 
and Australia:  A Comparative Analysis.”  Water 
Resources Bulletin. 22:425-438. 
 
Wilhite, Donald A. (ed.).  (1993).  Drought Assessment, 
Management, and Planning:  Theory and Case 
Studies.  Boston, MA:  Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Wilhite, Donald A. and William E. Easterling, with 
Deborah A. Wood (eds.).  (1987).  Planning for 
Drought.  Boulder, Colorado.  Westview Press. 
 
Yevjevich, V. Luis da Cunha, & Evan Vlachos (eds.).  
(1983).  Coping with Droughts.  Littleton, Colorado:  
Water Resources Publications. 
 
Zilberman, D., A. Dinar, S. Brown, F. Castillo, M. 
Khanna, & N. MacDougall.  (1992).  “How California 
Responded to the Drought.” Department of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of 
California, Berkeley. Preliminary Report. 
 
Zilberman, D. Ariel Dinar, Neal MacDougall, Madhu 
Khanna, Cheeryl Brown, & Federico Castillo.  (1998).  
“Private and Institutional Adaptation to Water 
Scarcity During the California Drought, 1987-92.” 
Resource Economics Division, Economic Research 
Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Staff Paper 
No. 9802. 
 
 
9291908988878685
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
10
15
20
25
30
Year
T
ot
al
 N
um
be
r 
of
 W
el
ls
 D
ri
lle
d
15
5 
R
es
er
v 
(M
A
F
)
Wells
Water in resevoirs
Figure 1:  Water in Reservoirs and Wells Drilled during the 1987-1992 Drought 
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Figure 2:  Use of Drip Irrigation on Selected Crops, 1987-1991
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Table 1:  Water Sources and Fallowed Acreage 1987-1991 
 
  
Project water 
Nonproject water Ground water 
pumped 
Acreage fallowed 
                           (thousands of acre feet)              (thousands of acres) 
 Northern San Joaquin 
1987 1,112 2,086 199 117 
1988 1,087 1,653 *324 117 
1989 1,128 2,048 140 102 
1990 962 1,903 164 104 
1991 846 1,613 198 157 
 
 Central and Southern San Joaquin 
1987 1,818 411 189 109 
1988 1,787 198 186 119 
1989 1,954 335 196 148 
1990 1,372 203 388 129 
1991 511 436 677 211 
 
 All Other Regions 
1987 258 5,482 36 34 
1988 289 5,879 22 28 
1989 300 6,047 27 26 
1990 307 6,126 39 25 
1991 249 6,071 48 30 
 
 TOTAL 
1987 3,188 7,980 425 259 
1988 3,163 7,730 532 264 
1989 3,382 8,430 363 276 
1990 2,641 8,248 592 258 
1991 1,606 8,120 923 397 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Adjustments to Supply Reductions by Project Contractors, 1990-91 
 
  
Project 
water 
 
Nonproject
water  
Ground- 
water 
pumped 
                       Water       Effect of 
  Acres         saving by     conser-      
fallowed      fallowing      vation 
@3.5 AF                          methods 
per acre                     
 (thousands of acre feet)             (thousands of acres) 
 
Averages 1987-89 
 
 
3244 
 
8046 
 
440 
 
    266                  
1990 shortfalls  
 
603 (202) (152)     (8)             (28)            (221) 
1991 shortfalls  1638 (73) (483)    (131)        (458.5)        (492.5) 
 
*One water district drastically increased amount of ground water pumped this year because appropriative source was 
reduced. 
 
 
 
 
 
